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Spousal Rights in Ghana: Legal, Customary, and Property Perspectives

January 28, 2026 Human Rights

Seth Doe 

Assisted by 

Sarah Asante , Philipa Hagan , Ewurama Mongson

Under the laws of the Republic of Ghana, spouses are entitled to certain rights and protections. These rights include: the right to property, the right to divorce, the right to custody of a child or visitation as well as general rights provided for under Chapter 5 of the 1992 constitution. Som simply because a person is married, does not take away their rights such as freedom of expression and association among others. 

This article specifically relates to spousal property rights protected under Ghana’s law. 

There are several sources of law governing spousal rights in Ghana. We have first the 1992 constitution, the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) and Ghanaian case law. 

The word “spouse” means a person’s husband or wife. It’s a formal term used to refer to someone you are legally married to. Property in this case may either be movable or immovable. Movable property refers to any type of property that can be physically moved from one location to another. It contrasts with immovable property, which includes land and anything permanently attached to it. Examples of movable property include: furniture (chairs, tables, sofas), vehicles (cars, bicycles, boats), jewelry. Movable property can be transferred or sold more easily compared to immovable property because it’s not fixed in one place.

Section 281 of the Lands Act 1036 defines land to include the solid surface of the earth, trees, plant, crops and other vegetation, a part of the earth surface covered by water, any house, building or structure whatsoever, and any interest or right in, to or over immovable property;

Spousal rights accrue when there is a marriage but the extent of the spousal right to property depends on many factors. These may include:

  1. Properties that were acquired before the marriage which remain the sole property of the spouse. Its status does not change by reason of the marriage. 
  2. Properties that were acquired solely during the marriage. 
  3. Properties obtained jointly within the marriage as governed by article 22.
  4. Properties obtained after the divorce or dissolution of the marriage. 
  5. Agreements in relation to the distribution of properties or the voluntary distribution of property by gift or by will 

THE 1992 CONSTITUTION

Article 22 of the 1992 constitution guarantees the property rights of spouses. Spouses are not to be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of the other spouse upon his or death. They have the right to equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage; and an equitable share of property jointly acquired during marriage upon the dissolution of the marriage and the right to reasonable maintenance upon dissolution of the marriage.

The court applies the equitable maxim ‘equality is equity’ in the determination of what is an equitable share of property jointly acquired. This principle was demonstrated by the court in the case of Gladys Mensah v Stephen Mensah (2012).

In that case, the husband and wife were married for over a decade in which they obtained 4 houses, two vacant lands, shares in companies, cars and containers. The husband started committing adultery and the wife petitioned for divorce which was granted.  The wife then claimed a  portion of the properties. 

The courts in determining the guidelines to be used in the sharing of the property held as follows: 

  1. It would be unconstitutional to rely on the principle of substantial contribution in the distribution of marital property upon the dissolution of the marriage. 
  2. Once property is acquired during a marriage, it is presumed to be jointly owned by both parties. It would therefore be wrongful for one spouse to dispose of the said property without the consent of the other spouse.
  3. This presumption of joint ownership is rebuttable provided the party challenging the said presumption can show that the property was indeed no contribution from the other party. 
  4. The courts will consider household chores as contribution. 

The court said: “We believe that, common sense, and principles of general fundamental human rights requires that a person who is married to another, and performs various household chores for the other partner like keeping the home, washing and keeping the laundry generally clean, cooking and taking care of the partner’s catering needs as well as those of visitors, raising up of the children in a congenial atmosphere and generally supervising the home such that the other partner, has a free hand to engage in economic activities must not be discriminated against in the distribution of properties acquired during the marriage when the marriage is dissolved.” 

The court also noted that the application of ‘equality is equity’ is meant to be on a case-by-case basis. The court duly recognized the fact that an equal (half and half) distribution, though usually a suitable solution to correct imbalances in property rights against women, may not necessarily lead to a just and equitable distribution as the Constitution and Act 367 envisages. 

The above notwithstanding, it must be noted that the paramount goal of the court would be to achieve equality. Thus, the court endorsed the Court of Appeal’s position to the effect that an inability or difficulty to identify clearly distinct contributions in the acquisition of the joint property would not in itself preclude a half and half sharing. 

This caveat was reinforced by the courts in the case of Quartson v Quartson (2012). Here, the court held that the principle of equality is equity as set out in Mensah v Mensah is not intended to be a blanket ruling that affords spouses unwarranted access to property where it is clear that they are not so entitled. The court found on the specific facts of the case that the wife was entitled to a value of the property having performed a supervisory role over the construction of the property but was not entitled to a half-half distribution of the said property. 

The evolution of spousal property rights in Ghana, evolved through several stages before the current position adopted by the courts. 

Indeed, in earlier years, the attitude of the court was that whatever property a husband acquired with or without the assistance of his spouse was the sole property of the man. The 1959 ruling in the case of Quartey v Martey is instructive on this point, where Justice Ollenu held that proceeds from the joint effort of a man and his wife and/or children were the sole property of the man. The wife and children were merely entitled to maintenance and support from their husband and father. 

Thus, the courts did not consider the contribution of the wife as granting her an equitable interest in the property. It remained solely that of the man. This position was heavily criticized for its unfair nature. A wife would slave away, assisting her husband so that they might acquire property together and ultimately, she would not be entitled to her just desserts out of the said property. This was unjust. 

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION

The courts slowly departed from the decision in Quartey v Martey, instead applying the principle of substantial contribution in the determination of the distribution of spousal property. 

A spouse could only acquire a beneficial interest in property if he/she could show that he contributed toward the acquisition of the particular property. So, in the case of Reindorf v Reindorf, the court refused to rule in favor of the husband, noting that the property in question had been solely acquired by the wife. The husband therefore had no beneficial interest in the property. 

The evidence of substantial contribution need not be in the production of receipts showing contribution but rather, contribution could be proved through other means. 

A landmark case demonstrating the principle of substantial contribution is the case of Abebrese v Kaah (1976). In which the husband had purchased a plot of land. The wife paid half of the purchase price, paid for timber and contributed to buying other construction materials. She also supervised the workers during construction and carried water to the site. The wife never kept accounts of her contribution. After the husband died intestate, his successor purported to sell the house and asked the wife to vacate immediately. The wife sued for a declaration that the sale was void because the house was joint property, and on the death of the husband, she became the sole owner. The court held that although the wife could not quantify it, she had clearly made a substantial contribution towards the acquisition of the property. Moreover, there was evidence to show that the husband and wife intended the property to be joint property for themselves and their children, which is the only reason the wife contributed in the first place. The assistance offered by the wife was far in excess of the Quartey v Martey threshold and the wife had established her joint interest in the property.

The court in Anang v Tagoe, ruled that:  where a wife makes contributions towards the requirements of a matrimonial home in the belief that the contribution was to assist in the joint acquisition of property, the court of equity will take steps to ensure that belief materialized. That would prevent husbands from unjustly enriching themselves at the expense of innocent wives, particularly where there was evidence of some agreement for joint acquisition of property.

The challenge with this principle was that it failed to recognize contribution that was in the form of domestic labor. Those were considered normal incidences which did not classify as substantial contribution. Again, this position was unfair as the court noted in Mensah v Mensah supra. The court noted that if a wife takes care of the children of the household, cooks and cleans for her husband and takes care of the household so that the husband is free to concentrate on work and bring home money, any property acquired by the husband, is indeed joint property. Household chores were deemed tantamount to contribution. 

The current position adopted by the courts, does not seek to undermine the right of a person to own property as enshrined under article 18. Indeed, as stated in Mensah v Mensah, the principle of joint ownership is entirely rebuttable. It may be rebutted in cases where the person shows that there was no contribution of the other spouse towards the acquisition of the property or the property was in the form of a gift or through succession. In such a case, the courts will not determine such property to be jointly owned and distributed on the basis that equality is equity. 

A case instruvtive on this point is Adjei v Adjei. The court stated that a person under article 18 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana has the right to own property either alone or in association with others. This means that irrespective of whether the person was married or not or the property was acquired within the marriage, it is clear that there is the probability that the person remains the owner of the right or interest to the property, 

Even in marriage the presumption of joint acquisition can be rebutted. These are by:

i) Gift inter vivos – property acquired by gift by a spouse and the gift is independent of the marriage relationship, then that spouse alone acquired the property 

(ii) Succession – acquisition of property through intestate or testate succession cannot be described as jointly acquired property 

(iii) Personal loans taken by one spouse to construct a property on land she self-acquired prior to marriage is the sole property of that spouse if the loan remains outstanding at the time of divorce 

(iv) Conversely, personal loans taken by one spouse to construct a property she self-acquired prior to the marriage becomes matrimonial property if the loan is fully liquidated during the subsistence of the marriage. 

THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT, 1971 (ACT 367)

The rights of spouses are not limited to those set out in article 22. On the contrary, the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) details certain rights for spouses. 

Section 19, for instance, provides for financial provision for a spouse. It states that the court may, whenever it thinks just and equitable, award maintenance pending suit or financial provision to either party to the marriage, but no order for maintenance pending suit or financial provision shall be made until the court has considered the standard of living of the parties and their circumstances.

This financial provision may be in the form of property settlement as set out in section 20 which provides that the court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party such sum of money or convey to the other party such movable or immovable property as settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of financial provision as the court thinks just and equitable. Payments and conveyances under this section may be ordered to be made in gross or by instalments. 

Section 21 ensures the proper conveyance of title. When a decree of divorce or nullity is granted, if the court is satisfied that either party to the marriage holds title to movable or immovable property part or all of which rightfully belongs to the other, the court shall order transfer or conveyance of the interest to the party entitled to it upon such terms as the court thinks just and equitable. When a transfer or conveyance of movable or immovable property is ordered by the court and the party ordered to make the transfer or conveyance is either unable or unwilling to do so, the court may order the registrar of the court to execute the appropriate transfer or conveyance on the part of that party.

LANDS ACT 2020 ACT 1036

The lands act provided some important rules pertaining to jointly owned property . The basic rule is that where property is deemed to be jointly owned, one spouse cannot sell or convey a share or a portion or the entire property to another person without the knowledge and consent of the other spouse. Section 32 allows the holder of an interest in land to transfer that interest to any person wth or without consideration. Per article 22 of the constitution, if the property is jointly acquired during marriage both spouses are holders of the interest or right in the property and may transfer that interest or right. 

Section 38(3) states that:  “in a conveyance for valuable consideration of an interest in land that is jointly acquired during the marriage, the spouses shall be deemed to be parties to the conveyance unless a contrary intention is expressed in the conveyance.” 

Section 38(4) also states that: “where contrary to section 38(3) a conveyance is made to only one spouse that spouse shall be presumed to be holding the land or interest in the land in trust for the spouses unless a contrary intention is expressed in the conveyance”. 

Flowing from the above laws, and as Parliament is yet to enact a law to regulate the distribution of marital assets under Article 22(2), the courts have provided guidance on how this distribution is to be done. In the case of Adjei v. Adjei [2021] GHASC 5 (12 April 2021) the following guidelines were provided:

  1. Distribution of jointly acquired matrimonial property upon dissolution of marriage is premised on the jurisprudence of “Equality is equity”.   


(b) A property acquired during the subsistence of the marriage must first qualify as a Jointly Acquired Property to fall within the contemplation of Article 22(3)(b) and in order to be distributed under the doctrine of Equality is Equity.  


(c) Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be joint property however, with the following exceptions to this presumption: 


(i) Gift inter vivos – property acquired by gift or through succession cannot be described as jointly acquired matrimonial property 


(ii) Succession – acquisition of property through interstate or testate succession cannot be described as jointly acquired property 


(iii) Personal loans taken by one spouse to construct a property on land she self-acquired prior to marriage is the sole property of that spouse if the loan remains outstanding at the time of divorce 


(iv) Conversely, personal loans taken by one spouse to construct a property she self-acquired prior to the marriage becomes matrimonial property if the loan is fully liquidated during the subsistence of the marriage.

 
(d) Marriage does not deprive the acquisition of individual property by a spouse during the marriage in keeping with the provisions of Article 18 on the right to acquire property either alone or jointly. By implication, Article 18 shall apply where there is sufficient intention backed by evidence to acquire individual property during the pendency of a marriage. 


(e) It is still the position of the law that the principle of substantial contribution, that is direct monetary, material contribution, etc. by a wife in the acquisition of property remains abandoned on the understanding that the “role of the wife in keeping the home by cooking for the family, preparing and performing other chores that enables the man to have a peace of mind to acquire the properties is a form of contribution” 


(f) The burden to prove joint ownership of property acquired during marriage is on the party who alleges to joint ownership

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